The dynamics behind the Taliban’s ban on Afghans fighting in Pakistan
In May 2025, the Afghan Taliban made an official declaration stating that it is not obligatory to participate in armed jihad beyond Afghanistan’s borders, and that any such involvement would be considered a violation of leadership directives. This announcement is being interpreted as a constructive development in the context of regional politics, and an increase in high-level engagements between the Taliban and Pakistan: in April 2025, Pakistan’s Deputy Prime Minister Ishaq Dar visited Kabul, with the aim of strengthening bilateral relations.
Nevertheless, this is not the first instance of such a statement from the Taliban leadership. In fact, they have affirmed on multiple previous occasions that their armed struggle is confined solely to Afghanistan, and have publicly distanced themselves from any militant activities abroad.
The political context of this recent declaration underscores the shifting dynamics in Kabul-Islamabad relations, as well as offering vital information on the Taliban’s internal strategic posture and decision-making process.
Background of the recent ban
The announcement restricting Taliban fighters from participating in jihad outside the country was delivered by Sheikh Saeed Ullah Saeed, a senior official of the Reform Commission, during a graduation ceremony for recruits at the ‘Hamza Police Training Academy' administered by the Kabul Police Command. The directive came as part of a speech delivered by Sheikh Saeed:
“These mujahideen who go with one group or another with the intention of jihad abroad, for these people, jihad is not applicable; the leader has ordered that there is no jihad upon them. So we say to these mujahideen, first of all, jihad is not obligatory upon you from the beginning, because it is obligatory upon the leaders, and even upon the (The Taliban Supreme) leader it is not obligatory because there is no capacity.”
Established by the Taliban government to address the concerns of Taliban fighters, currently, the Commission’s principal task has been to ensure effective enforcement of the order prohibiting Afghan fighters from engaging in armed operations outside the country. In particular, there is a focus on dissuading fighters in Afghanistan from joining the ranks of the Pakistani Taliban infighting against the security forces in Pakistan.
This is not the first time the Taliban have announced a ban on participation in jihad outside of the country, but rather, the re-announcement of an existing directive. Prior to Sheikh Saeed Ullah’s statement, in August 2023, the Taliban’s acting Minister of Defense and Deputy Leader, Mullah Mohammad Yaqoob, first announced this restriction during a conference in Kabul organized for the Ministry of Defence. He conveyed the Supreme Leader’s directive prohibiting involvement in foreign jihad, instead urging committed supporters to focus their efforts on strengthening the Taliban government within Afghanistan –as jihad:
“No one understands the meaning of jihad. What are we doing in service— is that not jihad? Striving for the stability of the Islamic system is jihad; only war is not jihad. Now the emir has ordered that anyone who engages in jihad outside of Afghanistan, their jihad will not be accepted as jihad. If the emir forbids jihad, yet someone still participates in it, that is not jihad, it is just war. This is our religious belief.”
In the same month, Mufti Abdul Rauf, a member of the Ulema Commission considered close to the Supreme Leader, offered a religious interpretation of the prohibition in a video statement. He stated that jihad in Pakistan is not religiously obligatory for Afghan fighters. Describing it as “offensive jihad,” he explained that such jihad becomes obligatory only when explicitly commanded by the emir, where, even for the emir, participation in offensive jihad is mandatory only if he possesses the capacity to undertake it. Under the current circumstances, the emir does not have this capacity, therefore jihad in Pakistan is obligatory neither for the emir nor for ordinary (Afghan) individuals:
“Jihad outside of Afghanistan (in Pakistan) is not defensive but offensive jihad. Offensive jihad is obligatory upon the emir, not upon common individuals. Offensive jihad becomes obligatory when there is capability. In the current situation, there is no capability, therefore it is not obligatory even upon the emir. No jihad outside of Afghanistan is obligatory”.
The nature of jihad: controversy surrounding bans on ‘foreign’ jihad
However, unlike in August 2023, the recent statement by Sheikh Saeed Ullah provoked a strong reaction. Shortly after his remarks were made public, Mufti Nadeem Darvesh, a religious figure associated with Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), released a 16-minute video on social media the same day. In the video, he rejected Sheikh Saeed Ullah’s religious arguments and challenged him to a public debate. He dismissed the categorisation of the jihad in Pakistan as offensive and declared it to be a defensive jihad, an individual duty for every Muslim, irrespective of capability.
It is important to note that Mufti Darvesh’s response was made in a personal capacity, and no formal or official reaction has been issued by TTP or any other Pakistani Taliban factions regarding Sheikh Saeed Ullah’s statement. In contrast, on 17 May 2025, TTP chief Mufti Noor Wali Mehsud released a special video message in which he stated that the Pakistani Taliban were engaged in guerrilla warfare and that the number of Pakistani militants is sufficient for this purpose. He added that there is no need for support from Afghan or foreign fighters:
“On the jihad front in Pakistan, the number of mujahideen is many times greater than what is required for guerrilla warfare. Therefore, I would like to say to the mujahideen of all neighboring countries, especially Afghanistan, that you have a religious obligation to support us in jihad with wealth, speech and pen, as we already have more than sufficient manpower”.
Mehsud further emphasised that Afghan militants are obligated to follow the decrees of the Taliban government, as ensuring the stability of that government is now their responsibility.
In addition, a religious scholar associated with the Afghan Taliban, Sheikh Sultan Mohammad Saqib, also issued a strongly critical response to Sheikh Saeed Ullah’s statement, describing his views as “foolish.” Sheikh Saqib does not hold any official position within the Taliban government or organisation, though his opinion carries a great deal of influence: he is a long-standing member of the Taliban and currently a prominent religious teacher, with many of his students’ holding positions within the Taliban’s military structure and government.
When the Afghan Taliban first explicitly announced in August 2023 a ban on their fighters participating in operations against security forces in Pakistan, despite there being less openly public opposition, criticism was levelled by Mufti Abdul Sami Ghaznavi, another Afghan religious scholar. Like Saqib, Ghaznavi is a former member of the Taliban and now a prominent religious leader whose students include a significant number of Taliban members, some of whom are believed to currently hold government positions.
However, apart from these two religious figures, no prominent member of the Afghan Taliban has openly opposed the ban since its initial announcement in 2023. However, despite a public ban, many supporters and rank-and-file members remain highly critical of the Pakistani government and military’s policies toward Afghanistan, which often leads them to publicly express support for the Pakistani Taliban on social media in opposition to Pakistani forces.
Jihad and international relations: underlying Taliban-Pakistan tensions
Since the Taliban takeover in August 2021, one of the major challenges has been growing tensions with neighbouring Pakistan, in which the TTP has emerged as a central factor. The end of the jihadist war in Afghanistan following the Taliban’s return to power inspired hopes among pro-Taliban Pakistani militants of seizing power in their own country, leading to an intensification of their operations against Pakistani security forces.
Most of these militants are individuals who fled to the Afghan border regions in 2014 as a result of military operations conducted by Pakistani security forces. At the time, they had covert arrangements with the then-Afghan republican governments, allowing them to take refuge in Afghanistan.
After coming to power, the Afghan Taliban attempted to mediate between the Pakistani government and the militants. However, despite considerable progress, the process ultimately collapsed by the end of 2022 when TTP announced the end of the ceasefire, and resumed attacks on security forces with renewed intensity.
During this period, accusations from the Pakistani government began to increase, alleging the involvement of Afghan fighters in these assaults, further escalating tensions between the two countries. For example, in April 2025 in North Waziristan, approximately sixty militants were reportedly killed during a Pakistani security forces operation. Pakistani officials claimed that they were killed in attempting to enter from Afghanistan.
Pakistan’s fears are not limited to criticism of the Afghan Taliban. In response to the escalating militant attacks, Pakistani security forces carried out airstrikes in March and December 2024 on alleged militant hideouts in Afghanistan’s border regions. Taliban authorities responded denouncing the strikes, claiming that they resulted in civilian casualties and constituted a violation of Afghan sovereignty.
Potential backfire for the ban
The Taliban are in a difficult position regarding the ongoing militant conflict in Pakistan. While they may strictly prohibit their fighters from participating in hostilities against Pakistani security forces, they stop short of explicitly condemning the armed campaign waged by TTP against the Pakistani state. According to the Taliban, the conflict is an internal matter for Pakistan, and as such, they claim neutrality, asserting that they do not support any militant activity within Pakistani territory.
In parallel with this political position, the Afghan Taliban offer a religious argument justifying their non-involvement. According to their interpretation, the ongoing militant activities in Pakistan fall under the category of “offensive jihad,” which, under Islamic jurisprudence, is not obligatory upon Muslims in Afghanistan. The benefits of this position are two-fold: both in claiming evidence for their own neutrality, and in dissuading Taliban fighters in Afghanistan from joining the fight in Pakistan.
Conversely, the Afghan Taliban emphasise that contributing to the consolidation of their own government is a religious obligation. Accordingly, their fighters are urged to devote their full efforts and capacities toward that objective. In this context, The Taliban’s decision to dissociate themselves—on both political and religious grounds—from their long-standing ally, the Pakistani Taliban, in the latter’s armed struggle against the Pakistani state, constitutes a significant and exceptional position. It reflects the Afghan Taliban’s clear prioritisation of the stability and consolidation of their governance within Afghanistan. This position may be regarded as bold, considering the pivotal role played by the Pakistani Taliban in facilitating the Afghan Taliban’s return to power. The Pakistani Taliban have cited their efforts to support the Afghan Taliban—by providing safe havens, contributing to their reorganisation, and aiding their resurgence—as a key justification for their own conflict with the Pakistani state.
In this way, Afghan Taliban’s deliberate (and consistent) choice to withhold explicit support or material assistance from the Pakistani Taliban’s ongoing insurgency represents a noteworthy step—particularly given the long-standing loyalty demonstrated by the Pakistani Taliban over the course of two decades, and the reciprocal support they may have anticipated in return.
Nonetheless, a potential complexity remains. An offensive jihad can be redefined as a defensive jihad. If the Afghan Taliban continue to perceive the Pakistani government as a threat to their authority, or as a “spoiler”—a view occasionally reflected in statements of distrust by some of their leaders and members—then support for armed groups active against the Pakistani state could remain a viable option or a “legitimate justification” for the Afghan Taliban, based on the same political and religious arguments they currently employ.