From Proxy Wars to Present Crisis: Pakistan's TTP Dilemma
Relations between Afghanistan and Pakistan have deteriorated to a very low level in recent months. Pakistan has conducted multiple airstrikes inside Afghanistan, including violations of Kabul’s airspace, as tensions continue to rise over the increase in Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) attacks inside Pakistan. Islamabad alleges that the TTP is based in Afghanistan and is being supported by Kabul. Afghanistan, however, insists it does not allow anyone to use its soil to threaten other countries and says Pakistan should address its own internal security challenges rather than blaming its neighbour. Meanwhile, border clashes have taken place repeatedly, leaving dozens dead on both sides.
The current tensions cannot be understood without looking at the historical roots of the TTP and militancy in Pakistan’s former Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). The TTP is a militant group largely composed of factions from the former tribal regions of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. Many of these groups were originally supported during the 1980s, when Pakistan, with U.S. backing, facilitated the arrival of Afghan fighters and foreign jihadists to fight Soviet forces in Afghanistan. Refugees, militants, and weapons flowed into the region, and local populations were exposed for decades to militant ideologies framed as a religious struggle.
Such long-term exposure was bound to have consequences. Entire generations grew up in an environment where militancy was normalised. When the geopolitical landscape changed after the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan in 2001, Pakistan faced a difficult choice: align with the United States or maintain relations with militant groups, particularly al-Qaeda. Pakistan chose to side with Washington. Many militant factions, once tolerated or indirectly supported, now saw the Pakistani state as an enemy. By late 2007, several of these factions had united under the banner of the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan.
During the U.S. war in Afghanistan, much of the Afghan Taliban leadership found refuge in Pakistan’s former FATA region. Thousands of young men from those areas supported the Afghan insurgency, just as their fathers had supported the anti-Soviet mujahideen. Over four decades, close ideological, cultural, and personal ties developed between the Afghan Taliban and militant networks in Pakistan.
When the TTP emerged, it pledged allegiance to the Afghan Taliban. However, that allegiance has largely been symbolic. The TTP has maintained operational and decision-making independence, and there is no evidence that the Afghan Taliban exercise direct command over its policies or decisions.
In many ways, Pakistan is now confronting the consequences of policies shaped during both the Cold War and the post-9/11 era. Training camps and ideological networks were established in areas already suffering from underdevelopment, limited education, and poor infrastructure. Over time, unemployment, lack of opportunity, and unresolved grievances created fertile ground for militant recruitment.
Today, Pakistan accuses Kabul of allowing the TTP to operate from Afghan soil, a claim Afghan authorities deny, insisting no militant groups are allowed to operate from their territory. They argue that many Pakistanis displaced by military operations had been living in Afghanistan as refugees long before the Taliban returned to power.
At the same time, the nature of relations between the Afghan Taliban and the TTP suggests it is unlikely that Kabul will take a heavy-handed approach against the group. With the presence of Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP) and the close ties between Taliban fighters and TTP militants, any aggressive crackdown could trigger backlash and even defections. For Kabul, internal stability remains the top priority.
Pakistan’s recent measures have further strained relations. The rapid repatriation of millions of Afghan refugees, reports of mistreatment, repeated border closures disrupting movement and trade, sharp rhetoric from Pakistani officials, and continued airspace violations and airstrikes have all contributed to an atmosphere of distrust. Afghan public sentiment toward Pakistan, already fragile after decades of accusations that militants targeting Afghan governments operated from Pakistani soil, has deteriorated further. Under such conditions, expecting Kabul to take decisive action against the TTP becomes increasingly unrealistic.
Pressure and intimidation may produce official statements, but they will not eliminate violence inside Pakistan. The roots of the TTP lie in local grievances, socio-economic disparities, and decades of conflict.
Pakistan may need to pursue a more comprehensive approach centred on dialogue, reintegration, and development. Peace with militant groups does not mean surrendering territory or compromising state authority. Rather, it means addressing grievances, creating economic opportunities, and gradually reintegrating fighters into society.
Pakistan could also utilise its relationship with the Afghan Taliban to mediate and persuade the TTP to reduce violence. Kabul has signalled willingness to help facilitate talks, but current policies risk making such mediation more difficult. The growing distance between Kabul and Islamabad over the past three years has limited opportunities for constructive engagement.
It must also be understood that instability in Pakistan will affect Afghanistan. Neither country benefits from prolonged conflict. Both depend on each other economically. Pakistan needs stable access to Central Asia through Afghanistan, while Afghanistan relies on Pakistan for affordable and timely imports.
In an era defined by trade corridors, connectivity projects, and regional integration, continued hostility serves neither side. As a result of earlier policies, Pakistan has suffered heavily from militant violence. What matters most is not the justification for previous policies, but the outcomes those policies produce today. If the current approach is only deepening mistrust and instability, it may be time to reconsider the path being taken. Peace, dialogue, and development may take longer than airstrikes and expulsions, but in the long run they offer the only sustainable solution for both Afghanistan and Pakistan.
All views and facts expressed are the author's own.
